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CHAPTER

Leesteffy Jenkins and Robert Stumberg

D

uring the last decade, animal
protection suffered a profound setback as a result of
global trade rules. Until recently, the
harm has remained almost invisible
to the general public because international trade has seemed only tangentially related to animal protection.
Much like Magellan, whose great
ships appeared on the horizon of
Terra del Fuego yet remained unseen
by the natives,1 an elite few have been
making global trade rules out of sight
of the rest of the world—acting as an
invisible hand affecting economic and
social policy.
However, that is beginning to
change, and animal issues are playing
a crucial role in making the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the international body responsible for initiating and enforcing global trade rules,
publicly visible. Current WTO rules
prohibit the types of enforcement mechanisms relied upon by sovereign
nations to make animal protection
initiatives effective; as a result, many
animal protection measures in this
country and abroad have been reversed or stymied in the face of WTO
challenges or threatened challenges.
The WTO’s adverse impact on animal
protection is one of the reasons why
the WTO’s new-found public image is
increasingly a negative one.

Where We
Are Now
The Third WTO Ministerial in Seattle,
Washington, in December 1999, dramatically revealed for the first time
many segments of the public’s growing discontent with WTO rules.2 An
attempt to launch a new round of
trade negotiations3 ignited street
clashes between protesters, including
some in sea turtle costumes (to symbolize the WTO’s anti-environment
policies), and law enforcement officials. The protesters, flashed across
television sets around the globe.4 The
ministerial meeting collapsed as a result of the upheaval, and sea turtles
quickly became a symbol in Seattle of
what is wrong with the WTO.5
Laws protecting sea turtles,6 dolphins,7 and dogs8; laws banning cosmetic testing on animals9 or the use
of steel-jaw leghold traps10; laws promoting the production of hormonefree beef11—all have been challenged
or threatened with challenge as a barrier to trade under WTO rules or its
precursor, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In each
case, when global trade rules were
applied, the laws were modified or revoked. These laws represent decades
of effort to establish strong animal
protection legislation in the United
States, Canada, and Europe.

At stake is the democratic stewardship of animals and their environment. Global trade rules govern not
only trade, but also the values a country reflects within its marketplace.
WTO supporters say that the WTO
Agreements permit countries to set
high environmental and social standards. But WTO and GATT case law
demonstrate the Orwellian nature of
this statement. Under WTO rules, animals cannot be protected if protection results in any adverse market
impact.12 In effect, free-market theory preempts all other social values.
The WTO does not specifically prohibit governments from establishing
strong animal protection or environmental policy, as WTO supporters
point out. The effect is more subtle.
WTO rules narrow the range of mechanisms available to governments to
create or modify social policy. Specifically, WTO rules prohibit government-initiated, market-based remedies such as sanctions, standards, and
even ecolabeling, if they are used to
implement and enforce animal protection and environmental policies.13
Yet today, much of the harm done to
animals and the environment is the
result of market-based problems—including fishing for tuna by killing dolphins, factory farming, and scientific
research on animals to reduce product liability. In each case the ultimate
consumer contributes to the market’s
impact on animals.
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Conflict or
Compromise?
Government policy is meaningless if
no viable ways exist of implementing
and enforcing its substantive provisions. In the context of global economic integration, this realization
in part, led to the strengthening of
the institutional and enforcement
provisions of the WTO.14 Similarly,
without viable options for implementing and enforcing animal protection
policy, including market-based remedies, the sovereign authority to set
high anima protection standards is an
anachronism.
The 1990s were characterized by
conflict and competition initiated as
GATT/WTO proponents sought to impose a dominant global economic
order. A strategy of “winner take all”
was pursued,15 and it extended to
challenges to animal welfare.16 Principles of free trade, not pragmatism,
governed decisions to challenge legitimate animal welfare laws.17 The public seemed asleep. Free market theorists had free rein. But by 1999 the
climate was changing, as demonstrated by the broad public interest piqued
by the protests against the Seattle
Ministerial. The question for the new
millennium is whether compromise
can be found.
Each new WTO challenge to an
existing national or international policy—environmental; animal protection; or consumer-related—creates
an atmosphere of insecurity that can
be exploited by those who wish to undermine protection. In the short
term, social policy seems to be the
loser. In the long term, however, the
viability of the international trade
regime will be at issue. Any WTO solution that does not take into account
social policy will inevitably create further conflict rather than reduce or
eliminate tension.
WTO rules are constitution in
nature: while they are vague and
broad in scope, they can also be reinterpreted to reflect changing public
perceptions and opinion. It is possible
to change the impact of WTO rules.
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The question is whether WTO supporters perceive the need to change
the rules to accommodate social values—values other than free-market
theory, comparative advantage, and
competition based only on the lowest
price.

Comparative
Advantage
Theory Does
Not Apply to
Social Policy
At the core of GATT theory is the concept of “comparative advantage.”
Comparative advantage is the rationale underlying GATT Articles I (Most
Favored Nation) and III (Nation Treatment).18 It is also the rationale used
to discredit the enforcement of environmental and animal protection policy with standards that regulate the
production or process of goods.19 The
objective of comparative advantage
was first incorporated in an early
GATT decision known as the Belgian
Family Allowances.20
In the Belgian Family Allowances
case,21 Norway and Denmark brought
a complaint against Belgium because
Belgium placed a levy on products
purchased by public bodies from
states that did not have a system of
family allowances meeting specific requirements. The panel decided that
Belgium’s levy violated Article I:1 and
possibly Article III and that the levy
was inconsistent with the spirit of
GATT.22
The rationale behind the decision
was comparative advantage. By requiring that all countries have similar
social/economic requirements, Belgium was undermining the comparative advantage that some countries
gained by not having such economic
legislation. The objective of comparative advantage was again articulated
in a later panel decision, United
States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930.23 In that case the panel found
that the purpose of Article III was to

“ensure effective equality of competitive opportunity and to protect the
expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.”24
As compelling as the theory of comparative advantage may be in the economic realm, it is not applicable to
social or moral policy typically embodied in environmental or animal
protection regulation. At issue in
environmental or animal protection
policy-making is the legitimacy of the
goods produced, or more typically,
the legitimacy of the process by which
the goods are produced. To use a real
example, the European Union (EU)
has implemented a regulation banning the sale within the European
Union of pelts caught by using steeljaw leghold traps. At issue for the EU
electorate were ethical concerns
regarding the appropriateness of producing a product in such a way as to
cause extreme animal suffering. Comparative advantage has no meaning in
this context. The issue is not whether
pelts can be produced at a lower economic cost by using steel-jaw leghold
traps. Rather, the electorate determined that the moral cost of producing pelts in this manner outweighs
any economic advantage. The electorate did not want such pelts, no
matter what the economic price.
Applying WTO rules to this type of
regulation results in decisions which
technically may be consistent within
the context of GATT, but which
nonetheless may be viewed as illegitimate or irrational by national policymakers and their electorate.25 When
GATT rules are applied to social/moral regulations, the goal of preserving
comparative advantage is input into
social policy. This insures that economic considerations will override or
outweigh the underlying social purpose of the regulation. The net effect
is to stymie the ability of policymakers
to use the democratic process to balance competing policy interests of the
societies which they govern.
In a democratic political process,
the concerns of various stakeholders,
including affected industries, are balanced so as to preclude an absolute
The State of the Animals: 2001

win or absolute loss for any particular
segment of society. In this way, policymakers attempt to devise solutions
that harm the fewest number of
stakeholders. Establishing a presumption that global economic concerns
must be given priority in the context
of noneconomic regulation promotes
autocratic, rather than democratic,
policy regimes. This is because a presumption of trade supremacy precludes policymakers from balancing
the diverse needs of their political
community.

A Balance
Originally
Envisioned
Trade agreement history reveals that
the original framework of GATT trade
principles and exceptions envisioned
a dynamic system that could balance
trade and domestic policy needs, as
well as global economic integration,
with national sovereignty.
Adopted in 1947, GATT-the-document reflects a theoretical balance of
interests that has not characterized
interpretations by GATT-the-institution (now the WTO). That balance
between trade and environment or
other domestic policy interests is
achieved not only in the GATT, but in
numerous places throughout the
WTO Agreements adopted or modified in 1994. For example, the Preamble to the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”)
provides:
no country should be prevented
from taking measures necessary...
for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or the
environment...subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised
restriction on international trade.26
Similarly, the Preamble to the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

(the “SPS Agreement”) states that
“no Member should be prevented
from adopting or enforcing measures
necessary to protect human, animal,
or plant life or health, subject to” the
same requirements set forth in the
TBT Agreement.27 The Preamble to
the Agreement Establishing the WTO
specifically recognizes the need to
[allow] for the optimal use of the
world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means
for doing so in a manner consistent with [countries’] respective
needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development.
While this language admittedly is
not proscriptive, it nonetheless conveys an implicit intent to balance economic growth with social values.
Proscriptive language to this affect,
however, is contained in at least two
places in the WTO Agreements. Article XIV (the exceptions clause) of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (the “GATS”) states
Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries
where like condition prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in
services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public
morals or to maintain public
order;
(b) necessary to protect
human, animal or plant
life or health.
Similarly, Article XX of the GATT
provides that subject to the safeguards in its preamble, “nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures”
(emphasis added) that are included
in the list of “general” exceptions.28
Article XX has three general exceptions that have great relevance to the
relationship between the WTO and
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animal protection. They include measures:
(a) necessary to protect public
morals;
(b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health
...[and]
(g) relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures
are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production
or consumption.
Article XX dramatically protects the
measures listed against conflict with
every trade rule save the two safeguard tests written into the Article’s
preamble. By supplanting the sum of
all other trade considerations, the
safeguards play a crucial role in preserving the balance between trade
and environment (and the other protected domestic policies). The preamble requires that protected measures:
are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of [1]
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or
[2] a disguised restriction on international trade.
This framework for balancing trade
and noneconomic interests was debated and designed well in advance of
GATT 1947.29 Two global trade documents developed the approach of balancing trade rules on one hand with
general exceptions and a preamble
with safeguards on the other, however
neither ever took effect. The first was
the 1927 International Convention
for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (or
the 1927 Convention), which was
drafted by committees and conferences of the League of Nations. The
second was the charter for creation of
the International Trade Organization
(or the ITO Charter), which was
sponsored by committees of the United Nations. While the ITO Charter
was still being drafted after 1947, the
seminal proposals from the United
States and other countries did predate the GATT, and they help to illustrate contemporaneous thinking.
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As the first serious effort to promote global economic integration,
the deliberations over Article 4 of the
1927 Convention yield the most extensive historical record regarding
the structure and purpose of the
GATT general exceptions and their
preamble. From the start, the goal
of the 1927 Convention was to develop a formula for abolishing import
and export restrictions while preserving deference for legitimate noneconomic policies.30
The League of Nations Economic
Committee (LoN Economic Committee) went so far as to describe the
Article 4 prohibitions of restrictions
on trade as “outside the scope” of the
Convention.31 It is clear from the discussion at several committee meetings that the delegates distinguished
between “economic,” or “financial,”
regulations and “noneconomic” regulations. The 1927 Convention was
designed to govern the former, not
the latter.
As an example, the delegation of
India expressed the view that only sovereign nations could determine the
need for trade restrictions.32 The
Japanese delegate emphasized that
“[e]ach country must be allowed
sufficient liberty to take those measures of prohibition or restriction
which it considered necessary for
non-financial or noneconomic reasons....”33 In this context, the balance
between sovereignty and economic
integration was a central issue for the
1927 Convention.
The delegates frequently asked
whether particular laws of interest
would be covered by the proposed
general exceptions. These were most
often questions about quasi-economic regulations,34 but noneconomic
laws were discussed as well.35 In response to the discussion of whether
various quasi-economic trade restrictions would be protected by Article 4,
the Austrian delegate raised the possibility of more detailed disclosure in
order to “get rid of the skeletons.”36
However, most delegations opposed
developing a detailed list or a policy
of strict construction. The committee
eventually arrived at a consensus that
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generic exceptions would strike the
best balance. The British delegate articulated the rationale upon which
the committee reached consensus:
If these noneconomic prohibitions were not covered by the
scheme of the Convention [that
is, protected by general exceptions], there was ground for hope
that the danger of abuse would…
not be serious. In pursuing this
course the Conference would be
taking the only step possible at
this stage. It should not set up
machinery relating to these noneconomic
prohibitions.…The
time has not yet come to include
noneconomic prohibitions and
restrictions, for Governments had
their special and peculiar obligations to their peoples in matters
to which they related.37
While generic exceptions would
strike the balance with sovereignty
concerns, the LoN Economic Committee also wanted to assure that
such broad exceptions would not lead
to abuses of the trade rules.38 At the
same time, the committee wanted to
avoid drafting the agreement “so
strictly and with so little regard to local conditions as to make it impossible to obtain general adhesion.”39 In
this context the committee drafted
the two safeguards for the preamble
to Article 4. Thus did the 1927 Convention explain its framework of using general exceptions and preamble
safeguards to preserve the balance
between trade and noneconomic policy interests.
The ITO Charter debates followed
much the same pattern. India, among
others, continued to express general
concern about losing its sovereignty
over noneconomic matters, particularly resource conservation.40 The alternating concern was still the potential for abusing the exceptions, as was
expressed by the delegates from
France and the United Kingdom,
among others.41
Based on a proposal from the United States, the ITO committee that
worked on general exceptions began
with a list of exceptions, but without
a preamble citing safeguards against

abuse. The committee inserted the
same structure of preamble safeguards that the 1927 Convention
used.42 The ITO preamble stated that
trade measures could not be “applied
in such a manner as to constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination
between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.”43
While the exact language of GATT
general exceptions continued to
develop, the framework of exceptions
with a preamble to safeguard against
abuses carried through from the 1927
Convention to the ITO Charter to
GATT 1947. That original framework
for maintaining a balance between
trade and noneconomic concerns
remains as a prominent feature of
GATT architecture.44

WTO Decisions
Undercut
Measures
for Animals
Recent GATT/WTO dispute panel decisions have increasingly curtailed
the capacity of policymakers to use
trade measures for environmental or
animal protection purposes. For
example, Article III (the “National
Treatment” clause) of the GATT permits the application of domestic regulations to foreign products so long
as they are not applied in excess of
those applied to “like” domestic products. The term “like product” has
been interpreted by dispute panels to
exclude regulation based on differences in production or processing
methods,45 which is often a key concern for environmental or animal protection.
Dispute panels also have narrowed
the exceptions contained in Article
XX of the GATT for measures “necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health” (Article XX(b)) or
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” (Article
XX(g)). They have interpreted the
term “necessary” in Article XX(b) as a
The State of the Animals: 2001

least-trade-restrictive test for health
measures.46 According to dispute panels, trade measures are only “necessary” if there is no other conceivable
means of achieving the policy goal. As
a result of this interpretation, dispute
panel members who are not experts in
the policy at stake have substituted
their judgment of what is “necessary”
for that of the legislature. They have
often rejected pragmatic solutions in
favor of hypotheticals that are not
politically feasible or have been tried
and have not worked.47
Dispute panels have also narrowed
the general exception in Article
XX(g), “relating to the conservation
of exhaustible resources.” Panels have
interpreted the term “relating to conservation” to mean “primarily aimed
at conservation,” which in turn has
been narrowly interpreted to permit
only those regulations that directly
accomplish the stated policy goal.
Regulations that accomplish the goal
indirectly or over a period of time do
not qualify for Article XX(g) protection.48 Although this rigorous standard has been modified somewhat by
the Appellate Body’s rulings in
Shrimp-Turtle AB and Reformulated
Gasoline, these cases have simply
constructed a new hurdle or test in
terms of the preamble (known as the
“chapeau”) to Article XX.
The Article XX chapeau provides:
Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by and contracting party of a measure.
When the Appellate Body addressed
the issue of the chapeau requirements in Reformulated Gasoline, it
applied what was essentially a “leasttrade-restrictive” test, although the
Appellate Body did not use this specific language.49 The Appellate Body
determined that an alternative means
could have been used to achieve the

conservation goal and therefore, the
measure was both arbitrary and unjustifiable and a disguised restriction
on trade. In so deciding, the Appellate Body substituted its policy judgment for that of U.S. environmental
regulators and found that an alternative non-trade restrictive method of
achieving U.S. policy could have been
equally effective from a conservation
point of view.”50 In Shrimp-Turtle AB,
the Appellate Body again substituted
its own judgment for that of domestic
environmental regulators, and again
found that alternatives measures
were available to achieve the particular conservation goal.51 These decisions affect not only Article XX, but
also other WTO Agreements including, the TBT Agreement, the SPS
Agreement, and GATS, where identical language is found.
The dynamic relationship between
local innovation and global solutions
is important. If the WTO uses its
power to block the use of trade measures for environmental or animal protection at the local (domestic) level,
the direct result will be to limit the
options at the global level. Limited
options at the multilateral level
means that multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) lose their efficacy. This in turn decreases the incentive for multilateral environmental
cooperation, increases the pressure
for unilateral (domestic) action, and
consequently, may temper the enthusiasm of some governments for further global economic integration,
thereby stunting the evolution of both
environmental and economic law.

MEAs Require
Strong Protective
Legislation
Previous GATT and WTO dispute resolution panels have suggested in dicta
that multilateral solutions are more
appropriate than unilateral action by
a single nation.52 While international
cooperation is ideal, it is not always
possible or even desirable for environmental or animal protection problems.53 In most cases, international
cooperation is a slow process, with
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necessary consensus resulting only at
the point of crisis.
MEAs are the high-water mark of
pragmatic, bottom-up problem-solving. They do not emanate top-down
from an international center of
power. Most MEAs come into existence only after their substantive policies are first implemented at a “local”
level, either nationally or subnationally within a state or province.
Consensus usually builds from the
bottom up. The first communities to
act are usually the ones that experience a problem more acutely than
others. For example, a maritime province may feel the economic brunt of
depleted fishing stocks, or a nation
with particular religious or moral values may recoil at the commercial
treatment of animals it reveres.
A community may not be specially
or acutely affected by a problem, but
it may still see itself as part of the
problem and therefore demand domestic regulation. For example, the
State of Vermont was one of the first
governments at any level to limit the
sale or use of chemicals that deplete
the ozone layer of the atmosphere.
Local initiative is essential to solving global-scale problems in three different ways. First, local initiatives
help build critical mass to make a real
ecological or economic difference on
a global scale. Second, the movement
toward a solution has to start somewhere: local initiatives are often the
first step toward political risk-taking
without which a global solution cannot be achieved. Third, local initiatives are necessary as experiments.
Nation-states, whether they act alone
or in unison, depend on ideas that
work to solve environmental and animal protection problems. Global environmental solutions cannot be developed in a test tube; the only laboratory
that works is policy implementation
on a national or subnational scale.
Many environmental and animal
protection problems do not respect
national borders. Although a single
domestic policy is a necessary beginning, it is not sufficient in scope to
conserve a resource (like fish) or pro153

tect a sentient species (like dolphins)
that live in the global commons.
The point at which nation-states
move beyond their own domestic consensus is the point at which an MEA is
born. An MEA is to environmental
protection what the WTO is to global
economic integration. If the WTO’s
trade rules interfere with MEAs, the
risks to the global trade regime will
increase, not diminish: if local and national leaders are prevented from devising environmental solutions that
work, they and their electorate will
associate the WTO with their own political and environmental impotence.
If the WTO does not achieve an effective balance for trade and environment, the movement for global economic integration will lose credibility.

Multilateral
Agreements Are
Hard to Enforce
International environmental cooperation has led to the adoption of more
than 180 treaties or agreements to
protect the global environment and
conserve natural resources. The need
for continued international cooperation is undisputed by trade and environmental experts alike. International cooperation increases the resources available for enforcement,
monitoring, and scientific innovation.
It can also be a mechanism for providing technological, educational,
and monitoring resources to countries that do not have the resources to
address a particular problem. If MEAs
are to be a viable option for addressing global and regional animal-related problems, they will need enforcement tools that work.
Developing the enforcement powers of MEA organizations is conceptually and practically difficult.54 Historically, enforcement powers have been
inextricably tied to the concept of
sovereignty, and only nation-states
have the sovereign right to enforce
laws within their own jurisdiction.
With some exceptions, the concept of
enforcement jurisdiction is territorially based.55 Theoretically, no interna154

tional juridical body may interfere
with that right, and granting an MEA
organization enforcement powers
may result in infringing upon the sovereignty of its member countries. Because of the limited options for international enforcement, the use of
trade measures by MEA members will
increasingly become necessary for
enforcement. While member states
have the means to implement and
enforce MEA objectives within their
territory through their police powers,
they have few means of implementing
and enforcing objectives outside their
territorial boundaries, even when
their interests are directly threatened. This would suggest an increase
in attempts to use trade measures to
implement and enforce both national
and international environmental and
animal protection policy.
The WTO’s Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE) has addressed
the issue of the relationship between
the WTO and MEAs but has come to
no conclusions. The question of whether MEA-derived trade measures are
WTO-consistent is unresolved. There
have been no GATT or WTO challenges to such trade measures. This is
primarily because there are so few of
them.56 A third treaty, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered and Threatened Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES), regulates
commercial trade in endangered and
threatened animal and plant species
through the use of a trade permitting
system, but doesn’t specifically authorize the use of trade measures or
sanctions. The permitting system is
basically an honor system. Members
agree to abide by their obligations in
good faith. The only recourse to trade
measures per se has been in the form
of a recommendation from the CITES
Standing Committee, the juridical
body which has authority over such
matters. In September 1993 the
Standing Committee issued a decision which provided interalia, “Parties
should consider implementing stricter domestic measures up to and including prohibition in trade in wildlife species now” (see Press Release
of CITES Secretariat, September 9,

1993, announcing Decision of the
Standing Committee, para. 6). This
came in response to the most visible
use of MEA-authorized trade measures yet—the U.S. imposition of
trade measures against China and
Taiwan for the continued trade in rhinoceros horn in violation of CITES. In
that case, the CITES Standing Committee, the judicial body with authority over such matters, issued a decision strongly recommending that
Parties “consider implementing
stricter domestic measures up to and
including prohibition in trade in
wildlife species now.”57 The purpose
of the decision was to encourage
China and Taiwan to comply with
CITES. The United States took action
by imposing a ban on the importation
of animal-related products. Because
neither China nor Taiwan was a
member of GATT, no GATT challenge
was possible.
Some governments, most notably
those of the United States and the
European Union, assert that trade
measures taken to enforce MEAs are
consistent with WTO rules and that
MEAs and the WTO are theoretically
international equals.58 The U.S. Trade
Representative’s office has said this
repeatedly in public briefings in order
to quell the qualms of environmental
and animal protection advocates
regarding the WTO.
Such statements, however, are at
odds with U.S. policy positions. While
claiming that nothing in the WTO
preempts the use of trade measures
by MEAs, the U.S. government has actively pursued a policy of ensuring
that WTO rules trump MEA policy by
including “savings clauses” in new
MEAs in which the use of trade measures are most likely to occur. For
example, in the Biosafety Protocol negotiations, the United States pushed
vigorously for language that would
ensure that members did not take
action which would interfere with
implementation and enforcement of
Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, a WTO
Agreement.59 (A savings clause is the
legal mechanism by which countries
agree and ensure that a new agreeThe State of the Animals: 2001

ment does not supercede obligations
under an existing international agreement, such as the WTO.60 It is the
means by which the United States
and others are ensuring that MEAs do
not supercede WTO rules.)

Where Do We
Go From Here?
The conflict between the WTO and
national and international animal protection legislation is ultimately a
question of social policy and sovereignty. These concepts stand between
the WTO and its vision of a global
economy. The thrust of this chapter
has been to emphasize how the original framework of GATT trade principles and exceptions envisioned the
task of striking a balance not only between trade and environment/animal
protection, but between economic integration and sovereignty as well. That
balance has been lost as trade negotiators push to further integrate the
global economy, imposing free-market
theories and ignoring social policy.
At issue is the type of global society
being created by the current push for
global economic integration. From an
animal protection perspective, current WTO rules create a global society devoid of humane considerations,
where the bottom line is profit and
competition, rather than cooperation, compassion, and conservation.
The former promotes over-consumption—characterized by a need to create increased market access—while
the latter helps encourage responsible consumerism. Economists would
argue that WTO rules form a valueneutral system. But the impact of the
system belies such statements. WTO/
GATT case law and practical application of WTO rules reveal a global economic order that shuns ethical concerns and brands them as “technical
trade barriers.” The imposition of
comparative advantage to social
norms ensures that ethical considerations do not affect the marketplace in
any meaningful way. Instead, low-cost
consumerism has become the global
economic mantra. It is a system that

lacks grace and long- term durability.
The system is subject to attack precisely because it has no moral rectitude. The original balance envisioned
must be regained if the WTO hopes to
retain public legitimacy.

Revising the Rules
From an animal welfare perspective,
revision or reinterpretation of WTO
rules is essential to making the global economy animal friendly. Of greatest concern are the issues of national
treatment, burden of proof, the scope
of the GATT Article XX Exceptions,
including the chapeau (which has implications for several other agreements including, the SPS Agreement,
the TBT Agreement and GATS) and
the issue of risk assessment with
respect to the SPS Agreement.

National Treatment
Article III of GATT provides for national treatment on internal taxation and
regulations, that is, all similar products must be treated in a like manner. For example, Article III(2) specifically provides:
The products of the territory of
any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to
internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products (emphasis added).
Dispute panels have interpreted
Article III to preclude internal regulations governing the production or
processing of a product.61 From
an environmental and animal protection perspective, however, the way a
product is produced is often more
important than the product itself.
In the life-cycle of a product, the production process may be where environmental degradation or animal
suffering occurs.62
The precautionary principle, accepted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development and elsewhere,63 embodies the belief that
environmental degradation should be
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prevented rather than controlled,
that conclusive proof of harm should
not be a prerequisite to environmental or animal welfare regulation, and
that even limited evidence of a causal
nexus between production and harm
should be sufficient to justify regulation. Production and process method
(PPM) measures are often the most
effective means of preventing environmental degradation and promoting
animal welfare. One of the main goals
of the animal protection community
is to make trade rules acknowledge
the value of process-related standards
and thereby embody the precautionary principle.
PPMs can be divided into two categories: “product-related PPM requirements” and “non-product-related
PPM requirements.” A product-related PPM must be embodied in and
somehow alter the final characteristics of a product. An example of a
product-related PPM is the EU regulation requiring heat treatment of
wood to prevent the importation and
proliferation of nematodes. The heat
treatment alters the chemical properties of the wood, which makes results
of the process physically measurable
and detectable.
A non-product-related PPM affects
the production or processing of the
product, but it is not actually incorporated or reflected in the final product. Examples of non-product-related
PPMs are the EU regulation banning
the importation of certain fur products caught in steel-jaw leghold traps
and the U.S. law banning the importation of fish caught in driftnets that
exceed the UN standard of 2.5 kilometers.
Only product-related PPMs are
specifically permitted under GATT64;
non-product-related PPMs are not.
However, in two GATT cases, TunaDolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin II, dispute
panels found that non-product-related
environmental PPMs violate GATT. In
both, the panel held that a U.S. law restricting imports of canned yellowfin
tuna caught using purse-seine nets (a
“process” or “production” regulation)
were quantitative restrictions prohib155

ited under Article IX of GATT. Moreover, the U.S. regulation was not an
internal measure as contemplated
under Article III65 of GATT because
the U.S. law did not regulate tuna as a
product. Rather, it regulated the
method by which tuna was harvested.
Both panels ignored the distinction
between tuna caught by encircling
dolphins with purse-seine nets and
tuna caught by other methods, because this was a distinction based on
production, not the physical characteristics of the tuna. The panels concluded that the U.S. law was discriminatory because the United States
banned the import of tuna from any
country that did not adopt a dolphin
conservation regime comparable to
that of the United States.
Many animal welfare laws—such as
the EU Leghold Regulation and Cosmetics Testing Directive and the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act, Wild
Bird Conservation Act, Humane
Slaughter Act, sea turtle protection
law, African Elephant Conservation
Act, and High Seas Driftnet Enforcement Act—incorporate non-productrelated PPMs. Under the reasoning of
both the Tuna Dolphin I and II decisions, these and many other noneconomic laws are vulnerable to a WTO
challenge.
To remedy this, the WTO Council of
Ministers should establish an interpretive rule (giving as little discretion
as possible to dispute panels or the
Appellate Body) that the term “like
product” as used in Article III, and as
applied to environmental and animal
protection policy, permits differentiation based on process or production
methods so long as the environmental
and animal protection measures are
not intended as disguised restrictions
on trade. Such types of products and
production method standards should
be permissible at both the domestic
level (i.e., unilaterally) and in terms of
MEA enforcement. Such an interpretation by the Council of Ministers
would reflect the principle that environmentally sound “production or
process” methods are an essential
component of the precautionary approach. The WTO should provide the
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following interpretative guidance:
(a) Discrimination: Domestic producers should be prevented from utilizing
production or process methods which
foreign producers are either de facto
or de jure prohibited from using if
they want market access.
(b) Assistance to developing countries: If developing country producers
are affected, sufficient financial and
technological assistance (including
transfer of technology) should be
forthcoming from the regulating
country in order that the developing
country producer can bring its production into compliance with the
PPM standard.
(c) Dispute panel composition: To ensure an accurate and comprehensive
review of disputes involving animal
protection or environmental concerns,
dispute panels considering newly interpreted Article III defenses should
include at least one panelist who is a
recognized environmental or animal
welfare expert.

Burden of Proof
As noted above, the plain language of
GATT Article XX is that “nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures”
(emphasis added)that are included in
the list of “general” exceptions.66
Thus, Article XX preserved the historical deference to sovereignty in the
sphere of noneconomic policy.
Unfortunately, GATT dispute panels have required countries defending
their laws under Article XX to carry
the burden of proof to justify use of a
trade measure to enforce a environmental objective.67 This interpretation was codified within the GATT
1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which provides that:
the action is considered prima
facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This
means that there is normally a
presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on
other Members...[and] it shall be
up to the Member against whom
the complaint has been brought
to rebut the charge.68

Although it is now codified in the
DSU, this interpretation on burden of
proof is inconsistent with the framework of the GATT regarding Article
XX exceptions. First, the very purpose
of Article XX was to countenance the
kind of “adverse impacts” to which
the DSU refers. Second, Article XX explicitly provides that except for the
two safeguards built into its preamble,69 “nothing in this Agreement” prevents a member nation from adopting
or enforcing exempted measures. The
dictionary definition of “nothing” as it
is used (as a noun) in Article XX
means “no thing at all” or “no share,
element or part.”70 In other words, for
purposes of Article XX general exceptions, a dispute panel may consider
only the safeguards in the preamble—
otherwise, no dispute settlement presumptions, no externally imposed limitations on policy alternatives,
nothing. As one commentator puts it,
“if the ‘nothing in this Agreement’
clause in Article XX means what it
says, why are any conditions outside
the Preamble relevant?”71
The WTO should adopt the position
that the DSU presumption that a
defending nation must bear the burden of proof does not apply to defenses under Article XX. To the contrary,
the policy of deference implied by
Article XX shifts the burden of proof
on the complaining nation, once a
defending nation raises an Article XX
defense.

Scope of GATT
Exceptions
Over the years, GATT dispute panels
have narrowed the Article XX exceptions. This narrowing also affects several other WTO Agreements, including
the TBT Agreement, SPS Agreement,
and GATS.72 As with the burden of
proof, the restrictive interpretations
go beyond the plain language and historical deference, which the structure
of GATT provided in order that sovereign nations could define their own
interests regarding noneconomic matters, so long as the Article XX safeguards are applied.
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Protecting Life or Health
Article XX(b) exempts measures that
are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” The general scope of this exemption is constrained on two fronts. The first
involves interpretation of whether a
given measure is “necessary,” and the
second involves the meaning of “life
or health.”
The Meaning of “Necessity”73
WTO Dispute panels have interpreted
the term “necessary” from the “trade
impact” point of view. The initial point
of inquiry has been: What is the impact on trade and is this impact strictly “necessary?” The development of
the least-trade-restrictive “test” was
an attempt to judicially codify an easily applicable test to determine the
impact of various health and safety
measures on trade. This test, however,
ignores the deference that the structure of the WTO provided to sovereign
nations to define their own noneconomic interests.
Democratic legislatures are designed to draft measures that balance
competing interests; the result is a
politically feasible compromise. Rarely do consumers or affected industries
get all they want. But WTO panels
have ruled that in order for a human
or animal health measure to be “necessary,” a defending nation must
prove that it chose the least-WTOinconsistent measure available based
upon the panel’s own speculation
about what the alternatives might
be.74 An interpretation of “necessary”
that requires sovereign states to
choose the least-WTO-inconsistent
measure to qualify under Article XX
exceptions denies any deference to
national problem-solving as envisioned by the drafters of GATT and
the earlier trade agreements. This
runs counter to the deference to national problem-solving envisioned by
the drafters of GATT and the earlier
trade agreements. There is virtually
always a less-trade-restrictive alternative. No WTO panel can presume to
know what action is “necessary”
based on the diverse factors that a

legislature must take into account.75
If the balance between trade concerns and deference to sovereign nations in the noneconomic realm is to
be preserved, any “test” regarding
what is “necessary” should be defined
from the perspective of the relevant
legislative body. A WTO panel does
not have the capacity to evaluate whether an environmental or animal-related threat is real or significant. Factors relevant to determining the
scope of the environmental threat
include public interest in the perceived problem by constituents other
than an “affected industry,” the
degree of public discussion about
available options, and limitations on
effective enforcement due to the
scope of the problem.
76

The Meaning of “Life and Health”
A dispute panel could interpret the
meaning of “life or health” as parallel
to the definition used in the SPS
Agreement, which is limited to “risks
arising from the entry, establishment
or spread of pests, diseases, diseasecarrying organisms, or disease-causing organisms.”77 This definition, however, excludes environmental threats
to animal life or health—such as loss
of habitat, excessive hunting, and pollution and other ecological imbalance
caused by human commerce—as well
as humane considerations.
When GATT 1947 was being drafted,
there was little discussion of the scope
of Article XX(b), perhaps because it
was so similar to language in the ITO
Charter, the 1927 Convention, and bilateral treaties; it had become “boilerplate,” in the words of a U.S. delegate.78 Prior to the 1927 Convention,
the LoN Economic Committee recommended a health exception that included protection from disease and
“degeneration or extinction.”79 This
additional phrase was dropped from
the text adopted by the Convention,
but it was retained in an explanatory
protocol to the Convention.80
The model for this GATT exception
was established when the U.S. and
British delegations proposed simplifying the 1927 exception even further
into its present form.81 Sanitary and
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phytosanitary measures were clearly
the foremost concern. However, there
is no hint on the record that the simplification of Article XX(b) language
was anything more than a decision to
use the most general phrase possible
to include the various health risks
that were mentioned in predecessor
documents. The movement away from
detailed list-type definitions to generic definitions is consistent with a policy of GATT deference to sovereign
articulation of policy purposes.
A much broader interpretation of
Article XX(b) can be supported by
both the plain language of the terms
“life” and “health” as well as by the
drafting history of this provision.
Defining “life” and “health” as pertaining only to sanitary and phytosanitary measures focuses the inquiry on
“impact” or harm to others (that is,
the spread of disease). The terms
“life” and “health,” however, also
have meaning in the context of the
impact on the individual: How is the
individual affected? For example, in
the human realm, human rights violations could significantly affect an
individual. Similarly, the conditions in
a dog breeding facility could significantly affect the life or health of an
individual dog.
Possible Solutions
As a solution, either the WTO Council
of Ministers or the Appellate Body
established under the DSU82 should
establish a new “interpretive rule”
with respect to the term “necessary”
as used in Article XX. The rule should
focus on the scope of the moral,
health, or conservation problem as it
is perceived by the sovereign legislator
or regulator. Factors such as public
interest in the issue, enforcement
limitations, and public debate about
various policy options could be considered by a dispute panel to determine the scope of the problem as
perceived by the legislature. The necessity to protect life or health should
not limit WTO members to only a theoretical measure that is least inconsistent with the WTO Agreement.
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This precludes solutions that are
politically or practically feasible and
ignores the original spirit of providing
a general exception.
Furthermore, the meaning of “life
or health” should not be limited to
“sanitary or phytosanitary” concerns.
Particularly in the case of animals, life
or health is often dependent on protecting animals from undue stress,
pain, loss of habitat, or other environmental threats. A new WTO interpretative rule should be established to
clarify this point.

Conserving Exhaustible
Resources
Article XX(g) exempts measures
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”
GATT panels have interpreted broad
terms like “relating to” conservation
and “in conjunction with” domestic
restrictions very narrowly. The plain
meaning of “relating to” would suggest that either a direct or indirect
causal link between the perceived
harm and the chosen mode of regulation would suffice. Past GATT panels,
however, have interpreted the term,
“relating to,” to mean “primarily
aimed at,” which in turn has been
interpreted to require a direct causal
link between the asserted policy goal
and the means chosen to attain the
goal.83 This narrow interpretation has
permitted panels to substitute their
subjective judgment regarding what
constitutes “effective policy” for that
of sovereign legislators, which contravenes the purpose of the Article XX
exceptions.
Another way of limiting the application of this exemption is to narrow
the substantive scope of what is
“exhaustible.” Some analysts have
suggested that “exhaustible resources” include only minerals that
are available in finite quantities.84
However, within the constraints of
such a standard, the WTO precludes
the use of an environmental exception to safeguard creative responses
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by MEAs and sovereign states to address some of the most serious environmental problems of our time
(such as ozone depletion).
If the term “exhaustible resources”
is narrowed, the only alternative available to a country whose environmental measure is challenged is to argue
that the trade-related measure fall
within another exception (public
morals or life/health) that has a
“necessity” test. As previously noted,
the term “necessary” has been construed by previous GATT panels to
require that only the least-traderestrictive policy option be implemented. In either case, the balance
envisioned in Article XX between
GATT authority in the economic and
financial realm and sovereign authority in the noneconomic realm will be
eviscerated.
The question of whether a resource
is exhaustible is a factual one that is
not limited by whether a resource can
renew itself. Obviously, species can
die to the point of extinction. While
the ecosystem of trees and oceans
renews the atmosphere, a significant
change through global warming or
ozone depletion can exhaust the specific balance that makes the atmosphere a life-supporting resource.
While rivers renew their own purity,
pollution can overwhelm their restorative powers.
In this case, dispute panels have
recognized that not just minerals but
also animals, plants, and ecosystems
can be exhausted.85 The risk is that
without interpretive guidance from
the Council of Ministers, future panels will not continue to give deference
to member-nations’ assessment of
whether a resource is exhaustible.
The WTO should require that dispute panels respect the plain meaning of the term “relating to conservation,” which could include traderelated environmental measures that
either directly or indirectly achieve
the stated environmental objective.
Alternate tests (such as “primarily
aimed at”) that rely on the subjective
judgment of a dispute panel regarding the underlying economic impact
of a trade-related environmental mea-

sure are not appropriate.
Dispute panels should also continue to apply an open analysis of whether a resource is exhaustible, not a
more limited definition based on presumed categories of what is exhaustible and what is not.

Public Morals
GATT Article XX(a) and GATS Article
XIV(a) exempt measures that are
“necessary to protect public
morals.”86 While this is one of the
most relevant GATT exceptions
regarding animal protection, it is
mentioned last because it has not
been used before, at least in the context of a GATT challenge before a dispute panel.
Like Article XX(b), XX(a) requires
a measure to be “necessary” to
accomplish its purpose. The previous
comments regarding the term “necessary” in the context of Article
XX(b) are equally applicable here.
The difference between the two exceptions is that articulation of public
morals by policymakers is an inherently subjective task, much more so
that determining whether there is a
threat to life or health. Therefore, the
legislative determination of whether a
measure is “necessary” to serve a subjective purpose can be likewise more
of a subjective judgment.
The history of debate from the
1927 Convention through the adoption of GATT 1947 confirms a common sense understanding that the
scope of the public morals exception
is broader than the other exceptions
and that nation-states were allowed
to determine public morals within the
context of their own culture.
The history of trade agreements
since the League of Nations shows
that protecting public morals has
been a constant concern and that language has gradually evolved from specific to more generic terms. As noted
above, Article XX(a) of GATT 1947
had two predecessor documents,
which never took effect. The first was
article 4(2) of the 1927 Convention.
The second was article 45(1)(a)(I) of
the initial proposals for the ITO Charter, which was sponsored by commitThe State of the Animals: 2001

tees of the United Nations.
The 1927 Convention exempted
“prohibitions or restrictions imposed
on moral or humanitarian grounds.”87
Like the other exceptions in Article 4,
the Economic Committee reported
that moral prohibitions or restrictions on trade were “outside the
scope” of the Convention.88 The delegates frequently asked whether particular laws of interest would be covered by the proposed general
language. Examples of morally based
trade restrictions included prohibitions on obscene materials (Ireland)89 and prohibitions on lotteries
(Egypt).90 The 1927 Conference
ended with a morals exception close
to what the Economic Committee originally recommended, except that
the language on morals became even
more general.
As drafted by the Economic Committee of the 1927 Convention, the
morals exception covered trade restrictions for “moral or humanitarian
reasons or for the suppression of
improper traffic, provided that the
manufacture of and trade in the goods
to which the prohibitions relate are
also prohibited or restricted in the interior of the country” (emphasis added).91 The Conference shortened the
entire section to read, “moral or humanitarian grounds.”92 While there
was no comment on why the Conference moved to shorten the section,
its action was consistent with the policies of (1) using the most generic
language, and (2) using the safeguards in the preamble to protect
against discrimination or disguised
trade barriers.
Apart from the generic exception
debate, there was no further discussion of whether animal or environmental protection would be considered a moral exception to trade rules.
However, it is worth noting that during the same period, another branch
of the League of Nations was negotiating a convention that included a
clause to prevent unnecessary suffering of animals during transport.93
This suggests that in 1927 international institutions recognized animal
protection as both a moral issue and

a sanitary or phytosanitary issue, as
they do today.
The morals exception within the
ITO Charter was initially proposed by
the United States as part of its comprehensive charter proposal. The proposed exception covered measures
“necessary to protect public morals,”94 which is the same language as
Article XX(a) of GATT 1947. When
compared to its predecessor language from article 4(2) of the 1927
Convention, “moral or humanitarian
grounds,” the ITO proposal carried on
the trend toward ever more general
language.
There was literally no comment on
the general exceptions recommended
by the United States within the first
ITO report (the London conference).95 Nor was there further comment on the “public morals” exception in later reports. It is clear that
the drafters of GATT 1947 began
their work with the pre-1947 ITO
Charter drafts, which were based on
the original U.S. proposal.96
Without any further insight into
the internal U.S. rationale for adopting “public morals” rather than its
older 1927 cousin, “moral and humanitarian grounds,” the most likely
explanation remains the preference
for using general terms rather than
specific examples.97 For example,
“humanitarian” concerns would be a
type of “public morals,” and therefore
the broader term,“public morals,” is
all that is necessary.
The issue of whether trade-related
environmental or animal protection
measures are protected by Article
XX(a) is more than simply a theoretical question. Many of the highly politicized trade challenges that have
occurred, or are likely to occur in the
near future, are animal related. It was
the infamous tuna-dolphin dispute
that first alerted broad sectors of the
international public to the limits on
law-making authority posed by trade
agreements. Policies affecting sea turtles (as symbolized in 1999 by the
widely photographed costumed demonstrators) became synonymous with the
WTO Seattle Ministerial.
Trade conflicts involving animals
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will likely increase public ire about
trade agreements. It would seem prudent, therefore, for the WTO to address the issue of how Article XX(a)
applies to trade-related animal protection measures and provide interpretive guidance to ensure that dispute resolution panels afford the
appropriate deference to sovereignty
that the drafters of GATT envisioned
under the Article XX exceptions.
As in the case of life or health, the
phrase “necessary to protect public
morality” should be interpreted to include solutions that are practical and
politically feasible, which would preserve the original spirit of providing a
general exception.
Public morals are defined by each
respective nation based on its unique
cultural, ethical, or religious norms.
A generic deference to national determination of public morals clearly includes protection of animals, among
other values of respect for life.

Arbitrary
or Unjustifiable
Discrimination or
a Disguised Restriction98
The Appellate Body in both Reformulated Gasoline AB and Shrimp-Turtle
AB employed a type of least-traderestrictive test in analyzing the meaning of the chapeau to Article XX. In so
doing, it substituted its judgment for
that of domestic environmental policymakers by determining that, from a
conservation perspective, nontraderelated alternatives were available to
achieve the conservation goals in
question. It also made the language
of the chapeau nearly equivalent to
the WTO interpretative meaning of
the word “necessary,” thus obfuscating the meaning of particular words.
The result is an overall presumption
that trade will always preempt social
concerns.
In order to remedy this problem,
the WTO Council of Ministers should
instruct the Appellate Body to take
heed of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which
provides: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to
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the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.” The ordinary meaning of
the word “arbitrary,” as defined in
The American Heritage Dictionary of
English Language, is: “determined by
chance, whim or impulse, and not by
necessity, reason, or principle,” while
the meaning of “unjustifiable” is:
“impossible to excuse, pardon, or justify.” Application of the chapeau (or
in the case of other WTO Agreements, where similar language is
used) should be limited to an inquiry
of whether the relevant policymakers
had a rationale, unrelated to trade,
for choosing the policy mechanism in
dispute. If there is a non-trade rationale, regardless of whether a universe
of other possible alternatives exist,
the law or regulation in question
should, as a matter of law, meet the
requirements of the chapeau. Application of any other rule results in an
infringement by trade experts on nontrade policy objectives and domestic
legislative authority.

Risk Assessment Under
the SPS Agreement
By its terms the SPS Agreement specifically applies to risks to animals resulting from disease, contaminants, toxins, additives, and a host of other
harms.99 It applies both to risks to
humans arising from contaminants
from animal food sources and to direct
harm to animals. Thus, the SPS Agreement is very important from an animal
welfare perspective. Despite this, there
have been no animal cases arising
under the SPS Agreement. Although
the Beef Hormone100 case involved
questions of human health rather than
animal harm, the case is instructive of
how a panel would treat the issue of
risk assessment should a case arise in
the context of animal life or health.
In Beef Hormone the dispute panel
found that Article 2.2 of the SPS
Agreement required that risk assessments specifically be based on scientific principles and that SPS measures
could not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.101 Although the panel determined that
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the European Union had conducted a
risk assessment,102 it said that the
European Union nonetheless provided no evidence that it had taken such
assessments into account in enacting
the measure in question.103 The panel
also determined that application of
the precautionary principle did not
override the explicit wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 and that the precautionary principle had been incorporated in inter alia Article 5.7.104
Furthermore, according to the panel,
none of the scientific evidence presented by the European Union specifically addressed the identifiable risk
arising to human health from the hormones in question if so-called “good
practice” was followed. Because of
these and other reasons, the panel
found that the EU hormone ban was
not based on a risk assessment as
required by Article 5.1 of the SPS and,
in addition, the ban resulted in discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade and therefore
was inconsistent with Article 5.5.
The Appellate Body agreed with the
panel that the precautionary principle
does not override the provisions of the
SPS Agreement. It reversed the panel’s decision, however, with respect to
Article 5.2 and whether the SPS
required a measure to be “based on” a
risk assessment. The Appellate Body
found that as long as the measure is
reasonably supported by the conclusions of a risk assessment, no proof
that the measure was based on that
assessment is necessary,105 nor does a
particular risk assessment need to reflect a “majority” scientific viewpoint.106 The Appellate Body nonetheless held that the EU measure was not
consistent with the SPS because,
among other reasons, the evidence
presented concluded that there was
little risk so long as “good practice”
was followed and the EU presented no
evidence regarding the risk resulting
from nonconformity.107
There are many potential harms to
animals for which no risk assessment
could be conducted before severe
harm occurred. Risk assessments are
based on scientific evidence which itself is typically based on years (or at

least some quantifiable amount) of
empirical evidence. The die-off of the
Monarch butterflies is an example of
harm that can only be quantified after
severe harm has occurred.108 The introduction of a foreign invasive species is another example where empirical evidence is often gathered after
harm has occurred. For an SPS Agreement to effectively protect animals
from harm (rather than simply to ensure that no barriers to trade occur)
the WTO Council of Ministers or the
Appellate Body must apply the precautionary principle are part of customary international law.109 This will
safeguard actions taken when no effective risk assessment can be conducted before harm occurs.

Conclusion
The WTO, with its eighteen global
trade agreements including the GATT,
represents a vision of global economic
reform. It also represents fifty years of
work by multinational corporations,
which now represent a powerful constituency for the WTO as a top-down
instrument to promote the supremacy
of trade rules over nontrade objectives
such as animal welfare.
The animal welfare movement and
the broader environmental movement
are no less a vision of global reform.
The evolution of well over one hundred MEAs represents a bottom-up
process of multilateral cooperation.
This progress is now at risk because
the WTO agreements threaten to
stunt the further evolution of viable
enforcement mechanisms for MEAs.
The trade agreements pose an even
greater threat to domestic trade measures that protect animals and the
environment.
The failure of the WTO, and before
it the GATT, to defer to nontrade policies is a threat to the bottom-up process of developing a global economy
that is humane and environmentally
sustainable, not merely efficient and
profitable. We have stressed that this
democratic deficit on the part of
trade institutions is not only a threat
to animal welfare and other non-trade
objectives; ultimately, it also risks the
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sustainability of the trade institutions
themselves. This argument is based
on political reality.
A nationwide study of public attitudes toward trade reveals that 62
percent of the American people are
comfortable with the pace of trade liberalization.110 But in even stronger
numbers, Americans believe that environmental problems are global in
nature (78 percent) and that there
should be more international agreements on environmental standards
(77 percent).111 Three-quarters of the
American people support the proposition: “Countries should be able to restrict the imports of products if they
are produced in a way that damages
the environment, because protecting
the environment is at least as important as trade.”112 But even more specifically, 72 percent of Americans favor restricting the importation of
tuna from Mexico because the fishing
methods kill dolphins, and 63 percent
favor restricting the importation of
shrimp from both India and Pakistan
because the fishing methods kill sea
turtles.113 In short, the diverse interests at the Seattle Ministerial expressing resistance to trade rules were not
a fringe movement, as trade promoters have argued, but a reflection of
public opinion on a massive scale.
The American people know that
they can enjoy the benefits of free
trade without sacrificing their humane and environmental values. If
trade institutions, including the trade
representatives of the United States,
persist in promoting trade supremacy
over the nontrade values that define
our democratic society, then those institutions are the ones at risk of becoming endangered species.
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Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 7 Environmental Law 223, 227–29. The Department of
Commerce estimates that 529,000 dolphins were
killed as a direct result of international fishers
using purse-seine netting techniques. On August
16, 1991, the U.S. embargo placed on the importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico was found to
be in violation of the GATT. See, United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (unpublished
decision), GATT Doc. DS21/R (September 3,
1991) (“Tuna-Dolphin I”). Two years later, a second case was brought by the European Union,
among others, and again a GATT dispute panel
ruled against the United States. See, United
States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (unpublished decision), GATT Doc DS29/R (June 23,
1994) (“Tuna-Dolphin II”).
8In 1992 Canada proposed regulations that
would ban the importation and sale of dogs bred
in substandard facilities (commonly known as
“puppy mills”). Studies showed that puppy mill
dogs had higher incidences of contagious and
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congenital diseases, many of which were not
detectable until sometime during the first year of
the dogs’ lives. In response to these proposed
regulations, the United States threatened to take
action against Canada under the Canadian/U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), even though the
trade value of the dogs in question was a mere few
million dollars. See, 1993 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, Office of
the United States Trade Representative at 34. As
a result, Canada revoked its proposed law.
9In response to public demand, EU legislation
was adopted in 1993 to prevent the use of animals
in cosmetics testing beginning in 1998. (Anonymous. Council Directive 93/35 EEC—amending
for the sixth time Directive 76/768EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to cosmetic products, Official Journal of
the European Communities L151/32–36 1993.)
However, because the Directive was based on a
trade-related measure (a non-product-related
PPM), the measure was thought to be incompatible with WTO rules and therefore, it was never
implemented. Anonymous. Report on the development, validation and legal acceptance of alternative methods to animal experiments in the field of
cosmetics, COM(97) 182 finals, European Commission, Brussels 1997.
10In 1991 the European Union enacted a law
prohibiting the sale and importation of fur pelts
caught with steel-jaw leghold traps, as of 1995.
Because of the difficulty in determining the difference between fur pelts caught with this
method and one that is more humane, the Directive provided that furs from countries that do not
ban the use of steel-jaw leghold traps or meet
other humane trapping standards are banned
from the European Union. The United States,
Russia, and Canada threatened to challenge the
European Union at the WTO if it implemented
this law. The WTO threat succeeded in halting
the EU humane policy. The outcome allows fur
caught with steel-jaw leghold traps to continue to
be sold in Europe, providing no incentive for the
U.S. fur industry to switch to less cruel techniques.
11In 1988, the European Union banned the
sale of beef from cattle treated with artificial hormones. The ban applies equally to domestic and
foreign-source beef. See, European Economic
Council Directive 88/146/EEC. Exposure to artificial hormones has been linked to cancer and
premature pubescence in girls (Bulger and
Kupfer. 1985. Estrogenic activity of pesticides
and other xenobiotics on the uterus and male
reproductive tract. In Endocrine technology, eds.
J.A. Thomas, et al., at 1–33.), although the risk to
humans of artificial hormone residues in meat is
uncertain. On the basis of the unknown risk and
consumer demand, the European Union adopted
a “zero risk” standard. The European Union made
this policy choice after prolonged and effective
policy campaigns in numerous EU member countries.
In 1996 the United States challenged the ban
at the WTO. In 1998 a WTO panel ruled that the
beef hormone ban was an illegal measure under
the SPS in part because it was not based on a
WTO-approved risk assessment. See, WTO, European Communities—Measures Affecting Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones) (WT/ DS26R),
Report of the Panel, Aug. 8, 1977, at para. 8.159.
The WTO Appellate Body affirmed the panel decision, and the European Union was ordered to
begin imports of U.S. artificial- hormone-treated
beef by May 13, 1999. See, WTO, EU communi-
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ties—Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (WT/DS26AB), Report of the Appellate Body, April 16, 1998.
12See, Shrimp I supra at 6. The dispute panel
held: “[T]he chapeau Article XX, interpreted
within its context and in the light of the object
and purpose of GATT and the WTO Agreement,
only allow Members to derogate from GATT provisions as long as, in doing so, they do not undermine the WTO multilateral trading system.” Id at
para.7.45. Although, the Appellate Panel specifically reversed this finding and the interpretive
analysis embodied therein, see, Shrimp-Turtle AB,
supra at 6, para 122, it nonetheless held that the
U.S. law did not meet the requirements of the
chapeau as the measure in question was both
unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination
between countries where the same conditions
prevail. Id. at para 184. In other words, while
using different reasoning, the Appellate Body
came to the same result.
13While some GATT/WTO panels, including
the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle AB, have held
that countries may pursue a high level of environmental protection consistent with the WTO,
in actuality this has not been the case. Although
few would deny that a country has the sovereign
right to establish its own environmental policies,
to date, GATT/WTO jurisprudence has limited
the range of enforcement mechanisms a country
may use to ensure that the policy is implemented.
For instance, in Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin
II supra., the U.S. policy (as established in the
MMPA) was to reduce to zero mortality the number of marine mammals killed as a result of the
commercial tuna fishery. In Tuna-Dolphin II it was
the means by which the United States pursed this
goal (that is, trade measures) rather than the
goal itself, that the panel found objectionable.
See, Tuna-Dolphin II supra. note 7, at para 5.27.
Similarly, in Shrimp-Turtle AB it was means of
protection rather than the goal itself (protecting
sea turtles) which the Appellate Body found ran
afoul of WTO rules. No GATT or WTO panel has
ever found that application of trade measures to
protect animals or the environment are consistent with GATT/WTO obligations. But a policy
can only be successful as long as it can be
enforced. When cooperation and persuasion fail,
short of establishing international police powers
or the naked use of violence by countries (such as
sinking vessels), there is no effective international means of enforcing environmental policy other
than through the use of trade measures. See,
Jenkins, L., Using trade measures to protect biodiversity. In Biodiversity and the law, ed. W.
Snape. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
14Dispute Panel rulings under GATT could be
vetoed by a single GATT Member, including by
the Member against whom the ruling was made.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on dispute settlement, adopted in 1994, provides for automatic
acceptance of a dispute panel ruling by the WTO
Council within sixty days unless there is a consensus within the Council to reject it. See, Article
16.4 of the DSU.
15Numerous social initiatives were challenged
during the 1990s, including an EU policy to give
preferential treatment to banana farmers in former colonies in Africa and the Caribbean (See,
e.g., European Communities—Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS27/ARB, April 9); and a Massachusetts
state law (Mass. Gen.L.A. ch. 7. Sections

162

226–22M (West 1998 Supp.) prohibiting companies that do business with Burma from doing
business with the Massachusetts government (See
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2288; 147 L.Ed.2d 352; 68
USLW 4545 (2000)).
16See, Canadian puppy example, note 8 supra.
17In connection with the shrimp-turtle case,
the Thai WTO ambassador admitted that the cost
of conversion to TEDs (turtle-excluded devices)
was minimal and that all Thai boats had been converted in a few months, but that it was the principle of using trade measures to protect animals
and the environment that the Thai government
opposed. EURONEWS. 1997. Trade and environment: Preserving biodiversity and health. Broadcast by EURONEWS in Correspondent, May/June,
1997.
18Snape, W.J., III, and N.B. Lefkowitz. 1994.
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27 Cornell International Law Journal 77 at 781.
19This is otherwise known as a “production or
process method” (PPM). According to previous
GATT panels, PPMs are not covered by Article III,
nor have past GATT panels determined that environmental PPM measures are protected by the
exceptions set forth in Article XX. See, Tuna- Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin II.
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27Article 2.1. provides further that “Members
have the right to take sanitary and phytosantiary
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38Economic Committee, 7th Session Report, 27.
39Economic Committee, Report of the Economic Committee to the Council, 15th Session,
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1927), 309. [15th Session Report]
40Comments by Mr. Gangudi (India), Minutes
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41Comments by Mr. Roux (France) and Mr.
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42Proposal by Mr. Rhydderch (United Kingdom), Preparatory Committee II Minutes, 7.
43UN Docs. E/PC/T/C.II/32, ll and E/PC/
T/C.II/50, 3–7.
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Article XIV of the GATS.
45See, Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin II at
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46See, United States—Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/R), Report of
the Panel, January 26, 1996 (“Reformulated Gas”);
Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DS10/R, BISD
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Article XX(g)). The panel’s reasoning was based
on the fact that it could not determine that conservation was the only objective of the measure
and further, that the United States engaged in
only a limited discussion of possible alternative
solutions. According to the panel, the United
States did not address the reasons for which its
conservation objectives could not be met by special marking of Canadian small lobsters (which
apparently reached maturation before U.S. lobsters). Of course, the reason the United States
eventually banned all undersized lobsters (originally it had allowed the sale of Canadian undersized lobsters with proof of Canadian origin) was
because it was very difficult to enforce anything
other than a total ban on the sale of small-sized
lobsters, and there was evidence that rampant
cheating had been occurring under the original
measure. See, id. at para. 9.5.1–9.8.
48In Tuna-Dolphin II, the GATT panel reasoned that only if other governments changed
their policies would U.S. conservation objectives
be met.
49The Appellate Body in both Reformulated
Gasoline AB and Shrimp-Turtle AB determined
that there were alternative means available to
achieve the conservation goal in question and
that therefore the chosen measure was either an
arbitrary and unjustifiable or a disguised restriction on trade. The effect of these rulings is no different than if a least-trade-restrictive test had
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50The United States argued that there was no
viable alternative (from an enforcement point of
view) to the measure in question. Though clearly
not experts in air quality control, the Appellate
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that alternative measures were viable. See, Reformulated Gasoline at paras. 4.10–4.17.
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appeal from , a denial of an application, as well as
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52See, e.g., Shrimp I, note 6 supra. at para.
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import ban on shrimp in order to protect sea turtles.”) See also, Tuna-Dolphin I, note 7 supra. at
para 5.24 (“[T]he import prohibition imposed by
the United States was not necessary because
alternative means consistent with the General
Agreement were available to it to protect dolphin
lives or health, namely international co-operation
between the countries concerned.”)
53A requirement of consensus can lead to
downward harmonization to the least common
denominator. Invariably, there are environmental
and animal problems that affect countries differently. For example, to some, the elimination of
fishing subsidies may be a hardship, while to oth-

ers it is the inevitable solution to over-fishing.
Those to whom it is a hardship may balk at strong
international regulation, even though such regulation is in the long-term interest of all countries.
(In this regard, in preparation for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, seven countries, including
the United States, submitted a paper to the WTO
regarding the elimination of fishing subsidies.
WT/GC/W/XXX, July 30, 1999 [99-2779] Despite
clear evidence regarding the harm of over-fishing,
discussions regarding the elimination of fishing
subsidies has been met with hostility by many
countries, including Japan and the European
Union.) Consensus in such circumstance may
result in weak international solutions that do not
adequately resolve the harm at hand.
54Examples of MEA organizations include the
International Whaling Commission, the InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission, and CITES.
55See, Jenkins, L. 1993. Trade sanctions: An
effective enforcement tool. 2 Review of European
Community & Environmental Law [Trade Sanctions] 362.
56There are three animal/environmentalrelated treaties that use or have recommended
the use of trade measures. The International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT) adopted a provision that allows for
trade sanctions to be taken against non-ICCAT
members who refuse to cooperate with the commission’s conservation program for bluefin tuna
and swordfish. See, Resolution adopted by the
Commission at its Ninth Special Meeting
(Madrid, November-December 1994). Report for
Biennial Period, 194–95, Part 1.
Similarly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the “Protocol”)
regulates trade in chlorofluorocarbons, carbon
tetrachloride, and trichloromethane but provides
for the use of trade measures only against noncomplying non-parties. See, Art 4. para. 4 of the
Protocol which provides that “the parties shall
determine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States not a party to this Protocol, the
import of products produced with, but not containing, controlled substances.”
57See, note 56 supra.
58See, e.g., statement of Sir Leon Brittan, vice
president of the European Commission, contained in Policing the Global Economy, Proceedings of the International Conference organized by
the Bellerive Foundation and GLOBE International, Geneva, March 1998, at 37. (“My view is
clear: where there is an MEA which commands
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Recognizing that trade and environment
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view to achieving sustainable development,
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be
interpreted as implying a change in the rights
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international agreements,
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international agreements.
60Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides a procedure for resolving
conflicts between treaties. The general rule is
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that the agreement negotiated later in time prevails. Because these new MEAs are being negotiated subsequent to the WTO Agreements, governments like the United States are taking
precautions to ensure that the new MEA provisions do not trump WTO rules. Specifically, Article 30 provides:
…2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject
to, or that it is not considered as incompatible
with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of
that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are
parties also to the later treaty…the earlier treaty
applies only to the extent that its provisions are
compatible with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not
include all the parties to the earlier one:…b) as
between a State party to both treaties and a State
party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to
which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
61See, Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin II.
62For instance, in the case of tuna caught by
killing dolphins, the issue is not that the tuna
cans contain dolphin meat; rather, in harvesting
tuna, dolphins are killed. The encircling and netting of dolphins and tuna is part of the production process rather than the end-product of
canned tuna.
63The most recent endorsements of the principle include the 1987 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, the
1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration, the 1990
Ministerial Declaration on Environmentally
Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia and
the Pacific, and the 1991 meeting of the United
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) Governing Council. See Naomi Roth-Arriaza, Precaution
and the ‘greening’ of international trade law, 7
Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation,
60–63 (1992).
64The TBT was amended in the Uruguay
Round Negotiations and now provides that the
terms “standard” and “technical regulations”
include product-related processes and production
methods.
65Article III, para. 1 recognizes the validity of
“internal taxes and other internal charges and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of products” so
long as the measure in question is not applied to
imported or domestic products “so as to afford
protection to domestic production.”
66GATT art. XX.
67See Tuna-Dolphin I; Tuna-Dolphin II; and
Eurocars.
68DSU art. 3.8.
69These include the requirements that “measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute (1) a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or (2) a disguised
restriction on international trade...” GATT 1947
art. XX (preamble).
70Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged. 1971. 1544.
71Charnovitz, S. 1992. The environmental
exceptions in GATT Article XX, Journal of World
Trade, 49.
72To date, there has been no direct challenge
under either GATS or the TBT Agreement. The
Article XX case law, therefore, is illustrative of how
a Dispute panel would interpret similar language
contained in GATS and the TBT Agreement.
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73The term “necessary” is used in GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV, and the preambles of
both the SPS and TBT Agreements.
74See, e.g., United States—Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna (unpublished decision), GATT
Doc. DS29/R (May 23, 1994); Thailand— Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DS10/R, BISD 37S/200 (Nov.
7, 1990).
75Charnovitz, Environmental exceptions, note
71 supra. Charnovitz points out the dilemma of
an exempt-purpose measure that conflicts with
multiple parts of the GATT. For example, a tax
preference for local industry to use less dirty fuel
might be less restrictive than a ban on dirty fuel
under GATT 1947 article XIII (quantitative
restrictions), but it could be attacked as a subsidy
under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
76The term “life and health” is used in GATT
Article XX, GATS Article XIV, the Preamble and
throughout the SPS Agreement, and the Preamble and Article II of the TBT Agreement.
77SPS Annex A.1(a).
78Charnovitz, Environmental exceptions, note
71 supra. (citing International Trade Organization, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance,
Part 1, U.S. Senate, 84th Congress, 1st Session,
at 442), 44.
791927 Convention, 224.
801927 Convention, 18.
81UN Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/30 at 7–13.
82Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”).
Article 17 of the DSU establishes that a standing
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Members of the WTO Agreements).
83See, Tuna-Dolphin II.
84Those who espouse this view rely on the fact
that original GATT drafting committees
described a resource as “raw material” or “mineral.” UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.H/50, 4; see,
Charnovitz, Environmental exceptions, note 71
supra.
85See, e.g., Tuna-Dolphin II at para 5.13 and
Shrimp-Turtle AB at para. 132.
86GATS Article XIV(a) states: “necessary to
protect public morals or to maintain public
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871927 Convention, art. 4(2), 8.
88Preliminary Draft Agreement Established by
the Economic Committee, 1927 Convention, 228.
89Minutes, 1927 Convention, 108.
90Minutes, 1927 Convention, 110.
91Preliminary Draft, 1927 Convention, 224.
921927 Convention, Official Instruments, 8. At
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was included within the terms of a broader section that protected restrictions that applied to
like national products. While the committe chose
to reinsert the moral exception, this episode illustrates the effort that the committee was making
to develop the broadest possible generic categories. Minutes, 1927 Convention, 107–108.
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(March 1935), 3.
94Report of the First Session of the Preparatory
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Trade and Employment [ITO London Report],
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32(a), 60.
95ITO London Report, 32.
96 “The [New York] draft Agreement reproduces many provisions of the Charter. Reservations entered by delegates to those provisions of
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provisions of the draft Agreement.” Report of the
Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment [ITO New York Report], Part III,
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Introduction, para. 1, 65. See also, Report of the
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment (Geneva, August 1947), 70.
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neither the State Department Library nor the
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100European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
United States (WT/DS26/R), Report of the Panel,
June 30, 1997 (“Beef Hormones I”); European
Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), United States (WT
/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R), Report of
the Appellate Body, adopted, February 13, 1998
(“Beef Hormones AB”.)
101Beef Hormone at para. 8.96.
102Id. at para. 8.114.
103Id. at para. 8.117.
104Id. at para. 8.157. The European Union
argued that the precautionary principle was part
of customary international law and should be
used to interpret Articles 5.1 and 5.2. The United
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more an “approach” than a “principle.” See, Beef
Hormone AB at para. 122.
105Id at para. 193.
106Id at para. 194.
107Id at para. 207 and 208. (“The [European
Union] did not actually proceed to an assessment…of the risks arising from the failure of
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108The effects of Bt corn on the monarch butterfly is a case in point. The widespread global distribution of this genetically modified seed
occurred long before laboratory tests confirmed
Bt corn kills monarch butterfly larvae. Consequently, the effects of this seed on adult monarchs in the field is totally uncertain. Literally,
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